In the 1970s South Africa, Northern Ireland, and the Arab-Israeli conflict were often grouped together as the world's most intractable political conflicts. Histories of intense ethnic, racial, and religious conflict had led generations of commentators to regard them as poor candidates for democracy. Curiously, the conflicts have diverged markedly in subsequent decades. South Africa moved through an unexpected transition to majority rule, while negotiations in the Middle East and Northern Ireland have moved forward dramatically at various times and then stalled. We argue here that the old conventional wisdom was wrong-blinkered by the misleading literature on "divided societies." Instead, these conflicts are best seen as a distinctive type of democratic transition in which achieving an enforceable settlement depends on the democratic legitimacy of the negotiating principals. Their need for democratic legitimacy creates constraints and also presents opportunities. We show how the principals navigated the constraints and took advantage of the opportunities in South Africa, how they have failed to do this in the other two other two conflicts thus far, and what would need to happen for them to succeed in the future.
The character of SAMENI negotiations
SAMENI negotiations resemble other transplacements in three ways. First, because they concern political fundamentals, the stakes are inevitably high. Questions of sovereignty, involving regime type, territorial boundaries, or both, are at issue. If an agreement is reached and implemented, it will lead to irreversible changes in a major part of political reality. The negotiations involve intertwined issues of personal security, economic survival, and collective destiny that have often been politicized by decades of conflict. Even if negotiations fail, or the agreement is not implemented, the power balance is likely to change, making return to the status-quo ante difficult or impossible. Political futures are on the line for the principals, giving them large and increasing stakes in the outcomes. In the National Party leadership because he knew they would oppose it. Even if a new leader wanted to call a referendum, he doubts that either of the likely contenders (Pik Botha and Roelf Meyer) would have been able to do so, given the need to establish themselves in the party leadership. At the very least the process would have been significantly delayed (interview with author, December 9, 2003). Given our discussion of the importance of timing below, this might well have been sufficient to derail it permanently.
If de Klerk had been killed, the only conceivable replacement who might have been able to carry the NP and the military through negotiations was Roelf Meyer. But Meyer was a very junior minister, without much standing in the party. It seems more likely that Pik Botha would have assumed leadership and resorted to reforming apartheid. SADF support for the transition was at best tenuous at the time of the referendum.
short, like other transplacements, SAMENI negotiations exhibit the life-or-death quality of politics that is about the basic rules of the game. This is why transplacement negotiations are so fragile. Reformers and moderates are still, in most ways, adversaries who must constantly judge one another's agendas and abilities, as well as reassess their own. They can signal to each other their intention to continue in the process, but to do so they must take decisive steps in facing down domestic opposition even before it is clear that an enforceable agreement will be reached. As a result, although the principals know that success may write them into the history books, the risks are huge. At critical junctures they must be willing to face down historical allies on their own flanks to gain a prize that will be theirs only if their negotiating adversaries can do the same thing. Moreover, they have little reason to trust those with whom they are dealing. It is, in short, one thing for there to be a potential coalition in favor of a negotiated settlement; quite another for it to form and sustain itself long enough to get the job done. Because this requires splintering existing coalitions and fending off attacks from historical allies who feel threatened or even betrayed, it takes creative ingenuity, courage, and luck.
Second, like other transplacements SAMENI negotiations occur in a power stalemate in which no one can impose change. Neither the regime nor its opponents can dictate a solution, yet there is a potential coalition of government reformers and opposition moderates who may be able to negotiate an agreement both prefer to the status quo. 5 For transplacements to succeed, the innovative coalition must remain sufficiently strong that, should an agreement be reached, its members can carry their constituencies along and impose the settlement on government hardliners and opposition radicals who resist it. Moreover, they must do so at the same time. Because multiple factors must come together in the right sequences, there are many more ways for all negotiated settlements to fall apart than for them to succeed.
A third way in which SAMENI negotiations resemble other transplacements often goes unnoticed due to the widespread proclivity to hive them off as "divided societies." Viewed in that way the conflicts seem to involve particularly intractable forms of political violence. It is true that there have been periods of considerable violence in South Africa, the Middle East, and Northern Ireland, but this scarcely differentiates them from other transplacements-as in Chile in the 1970s or El Salvador in the 1980s for example. Yet it is not so much the amount of violence that commentators focus on as the type, and in particular the fact that it occurs among groups that define themselves by reference to such categories as race, religion, or ethnicity. The common assumption that these categories are ascriptive, if not primordial, leads people to misidentify the conflicts as inherently zero-sum, and to miss the possibilities for unanticipated alliances and the redefinition of political identities as negotiations evolve. That there was a non-Solomonic settlement in South Africa surprised many people. If our analysis is correct they should not have been surprised, and those who continue to insist on the sui generis character of the violence in the Middle East and Northern Ireland should not make the same error.
Yet on our account SAMENI transplacements are nonetheless distinctive. They are a type of transplacement that is both complicated and motivated by conditions of imperfect democracy. Unlike standard transplacements in countries like Spain, Poland, and Chile, the government is democratically
elected. Yet they are imperfectly democratic because large populations under the government's control are disenfranchised or partly enfranchised in ways that are widely seen as unjust. This reality gives the regimes inherent legitimacy problems because they must claim to be democratic when they obviously are not. By entering negotiations, reformers acknowledge, however implicitly, this deficiency in their system. This means that they are usually on the defensive-arguing about the terms and pace of change rather than its necessity. This in turn means that no settlement can succeed unless there is broad agreement that the democratic deficit that gave impetus to negotiations has been substantially attenuated, if not abolished. Once parties to a conflict appeal to democracy as their source of legitimation, widely accepted democratic norms rule out racial oligarchies, and in today's world they You cannot have a Jewish and democratic state without dividing this land, and those who oppose that are dooming Israel to an apartheid state, which might have secure borders, but might not be worth securing. Barak is on a purely Zionist mission to bring Israel back into borders where it can be Jewish, just, democratic-and secure." 6 The opposition in SAMENI conflicts often emanates from a liberation movement and is not, as such, democratically elected, but it gains significant leverage from the fact that the government lacks reformers and moderates do not refer to the content of political ideologies. Rather, they denote players who are willing to entertain outcomes that differ from their political ideals in search of a mutually acceptable solution. 6 Moshe Halbertal, as quoted by Thomas Friedman, "Yasir Arafat's Moment," New York Times, July 28, 2000: A21.
democratic legitimacy. Yet by entering negotiations, the opposition inevitably becomes democratically constrained as well. Its leaders must be able to claim credibly that they represent a major constituency, if not the majority, and to move toward a settlement that will be popularly validated. In short, although the regime and its opponents may both be imperfectly democratic, they claim to be democrats and depend on popular support in a more robust sense than the players in other transplacements. The need for democratic legitimation greatly complicates negotiations, defying attempts to reduce them to stylized elite games. We are thus sympathetic to Elisabeth Wood's contention that the transitions literature has been overly focused on elite interactions, with insufficient attention to the larger political contexts within which they occur. 7 But where Wood contends that such negotiations are driven from below, we take a more interactive view. Negotiators are constrained by popular opinion, but to succeed elites must make the right choices at critical junctures-including choices about how to respond to popular opinion and when to try to shape it. One of the trickiest problems arises from the reality that negotiating a settlement usually involves concessions that force the principals to move away from their mandates. The challenge then becomes finding ways to avoid alienating constituencies whose endorsement is essential to the settlement's legitimacy.
The central question in all transplacements is: can the reformers and moderates agree on a settlement and successfully face down the hardliners and radicals on their flanks? However, SAMENI transplacements are distinctive in that the parties must also maintain enough grass roots support that backers of the ancién regime continue to see the settlement as legitimate while partisans of the new dispensation regard it as repairing the democratic deficit. Moreover, the dynamics of negotiations will be affected by democratic turnovers in power. If the negotiating government falls at the polls, as has often been the case in Israel, new players must then establish their credentials as bona fide reformers intent on concluding an agreement. As well as constantly reassessing their own interests in proceeding, both sides must thus worry about whether the other can maintain enough support among their core constituencies to carry through their own side of the bargain. They must also worry about how concessions they might make threaten to alienate their own supporters. Barak's willingness to put sovereignty over parts of Jerusalem on the 
Onset of SAMENI negotiations
Catalysts for SAMENI negotiations can take the form of sticks, carrots, or-more likelyboth. For government reformers the main stick will likely be an increasingly costly, deteriorating status quo, depleting their political capital and increasing their will to negotiate. This may be because of internal developments such as terrorist bombings or an ungovernability campaign; or because of external factors such as sanctions, pressure from international human rights groups or a powerful ally.
Changing structural, global, or popular constraints may render the status quo less viable, and alternatives more readily imaginable. Evolving ideological paradigms can also shift perceptions of the viability or meaning of persisting in conflict. For instance, the fall of communism or the increasing bankruptcy of race as an organizing principle of political and social life might undercut the grounds that have justified violence hitherto. Carrots could include the prospect of peace and an end to pariah status in world opinion, a variety of economic incentives, or a desire to do the right thing and go down in history as a statesman.
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Comparable considerations apply to the opposition. Sticks might include the inability to sustain grassroots support for a costly and unwinnable guerrilla war, international pressure, depleted weapons, or dissension within the liberation movement. Among the carrots may be the legitimation afforded by recognition and talks with the government, the allure of power, access to international players, promises of economic support from third parties, or the advantages of peace and prosperity. In all three cases under discussion, the combination of sticks and carrots ushered in unprecedented negotiations that held out the hope of ending decades of intractable conflict.
How the unthinkable became thinkable in South Africa
Throughout the 1980s the South African government faced a deteriorating status quo. The ungovernability campaign mounted by the United Democratic Front (UDF) massively raised the costs of keeping order in the townships by organizing a generation of young black activists with a more 9 Some incentives are long-standing. For example, most observers argue that business elites in South Africa, Northern Ireland, and Israel have long favored a peace settlement, and we have found striking evidence of this in Israel, where all 15 of 15 top business executives we surveyed favored an agreement. However, there is no evidence in any of these cases that the pressure from the business community was responsible for either beginning or continuing negotiations. militant opposition style than their parents. 10 The currency collapse that followed South Africa's inability to meet international debt obligations in 1985 sent the economy into a tail-spin, and the relentless chorus of outside political and economic pressure began to be matched by attacks on apartheid from growing numbers of Afrikaner intellectuals. 11 By the second half of the 1980s, polls revealed that most whites believed that apartheid threatened the country's future. 12 NP confidence in the medium-term viability of the apartheid state was particularly shaken by the escalation of violence following the collapse of the second phase of CODESA roundtable negotiations in May 1992. 13 The two most important carrots had to do with the collapsing Soviet Empire after the mid- opened up the possibility of a new status quo that could subsequently develop into full majority ruleas turned out to be the case.
Shifting constraints and possibilities in the Middle East
The Israeli decision to enter negotiations mirrored the South African one in several ways.
Maintaining the status quo had became more expensive with the eruption of the first intifada. him to confront the possibility of an end-game rather than an endless peace process. Time and momentum were on his side, but if things dragged on for long enough without an agreement, they would turn against him.
Opportunities to end stalemate in Northern Ireland
Negotiations in Northern Ireland resulted from a different mix of sticks and carrots. Neither Understanding why the outcomes diverged as they did concerns us next.
Theory and practice of commitment
If negotiations are to lead to viable agreements, the adversaries must rely on one another. A potential obstacle is the classic commitment problem described by Schelling: if each side knows that the other might subsequently defect, why should either agree? 32 In theory, commitment problems are ubiquitous in democratic politics, given the lack of third party enforcement. Despite numerous attempts to show that compliance with democratic outcomes can be in the interests of all, no theoretical account has been developed that shows why electoral losers with the power to defect so often do not do so. results that consign them to political oblivion. We must therefore take care not to judge agreements in the transition context by a standard that predicts perpetual civil war throughout the democratic world.
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That said, there are reasons to expect commitment problems surrounding transplacements to be particularly acute. Following decades of sometimes-violent conflict, they are marriages of convenience among parties with little reason for mutual trust. As Rabin put it in 1993: "Peace is not made with friends. Peace is made with enemies, some of whom-and I won't name names-I loathe very much." 35 Even if reformers and moderates are willing to move toward agreement, they will be skeptical of one another's good faith.
This is further complicated in the quasi-democratic settings characteristic of SAMENI transplacements because the negotiating partners must be responsive to public opinion. Indeed, it might be possible for opponents of negotiations to use public opinion to undermine reformers or even to remove them from power. Unless the reformers and moderates build support for the idea of an agreement among the grass roots constituencies they depend on, the rug will be pulled out from under
them. Yet by the same token negotiators can also employ the constraints of democratic legitimation to signal their commitment to a settlement. By making concessions public, political elites tie themselves to positions they will not credibly be able to abandon without damaging their political careers. In so doing they burn bridges to existing sources of legitimation, forcing them to look for new ones. In this sense the quasi-democratic character of SAMENI negotiations may offer possibilities for dealing with commitment problems that are not available in other transplacements.
Reformers and moderates have incentives to do what they can to help strengthen one another to deal with hostile flanks, but these incentives are mixed. On the one hand they need to strengthen their adversaries. Because negotiated transitions occur only when government reformers and opposition moderates are too weak to achieve unilateral change but strong enough to achieve it if they cooperate, they must have adversaries who can deliver. Yet, on the other hand, they must not strengthen their adversaries too much. Both sides will want to extract the best possible terms for their supporters so far as the content of an agreement is concerned, and they have no reason to make this task more difficult than necessary. Moreover, in many cases the protagonists will expect to compete for political support in the new order, if it arrives, and a stronger adversary is more difficult to compete with than a weaker one. Even if the eventual settlement is expected to be a partition, other considerations create similar pressures. Strengthening your adversary will turn out to have been costly if there is no agreement and 34 For elaboration see Shapiro, The State of Democratic Theory, pp. 88-93. the situation reverts to one of open conflict. While each side has incentives to optimize its own political strength vis-à-vis conservative and revolutionary flanks, it is thus optimal for them if their adversary merely satisfices: becomes just strong enough to deliver an agreement from which potential spoilers can be marginalized if they cannot be co-opted.
36
The capacity to demonstrate commitment is shaped by how bad things are likely to get should the negotiations fail. If the principals believe that withdrawing from negotiations is either unlikely or exceedingly costly for them, this will stiffen their backs to stay the course when the going gets rough.
More important, passing a costly or unacceptable reversion point helps them signal to their negotiating adversaries that they are serious about achieving a successful agreement. This is why things sometimes have to get worse before they can get better. An unpalatable reversion point for either or both parties by no means guarantees agreement-there are other possibilities such as civil war or military coup.
But if your adversary knows that the status-quo ante is decreasingly tenable for you, it becomes easier for him to believe that you are serious about looking for an accommodation.
Both sides must be concerned not only with an adversary's political will to reach an agreement, but also with their capacity to deliver. As a result, the credibility of negotiating commitments is unavoidably dependent on how successful reformers and moderates are at co-opting or marginalizing flank attacks. You have little reason to trust even an adversary you believe to be sincere if you think that the ground may be cut from under him. This belief can be forestalled in various ways.
One is to actually be the flanking force. This Nixon-to-China logic suggests that the closer negotiators are to the potential extremes in their parties, the more credible their commitments will be. The alternative is to face down the flanking opposition at critical junctures, or visibly to burn bridges with it while retaining the support of the military. One way or another, the negotiating principals must ensure that their adversaries have good reasons to believe that they can deliver down the stretch.
Textbook success in South Africa
These commitment problems were managed in three ways in South Africa. First, the situation on the ground became decreasingly attractive to the NP and eventually even to the ANC. The combination of economic malaise, a sustained national uprising, and international opprobrium took an increasing toll on white South Africans. The September 1992 Bisho massacre made graphic the possibility that escalating violence could spiral out of control, forcing both sides to look into the abyss 
Missed opportunity in the Middle East
40 However, there is meaningful local and regional political competition. In the Eastern Cape, the United Democratic Movement (UDM) formed by Bantu Holomisa who was expelled from the ANC in 1997 and Roelf Meyer, who had led the NP negotiating team in the transition, took away a substantial portion of the ANC vote to become the official opposition party in 1999. The Christian Democratic Party did the same thing in the Northern Transvaal. In both 1994 and 1999 Inkatha won elections in Natal, and the NP (in coalition with the DP after 1999) governs the Western Cape. 41 After the first election much of the NP defected to other opposition parties. 42 See, for instance, Jung and Shapiro, "South Africa's negotiated transition," pp. 300-301. The IRA responded by announcing a second ceasefire on July 20, 1997, while continuing to refuse to decommission. Since the Unionists had made decommissioning a precondition of negotiations, Trimble took the risky decision to enter talks that could have gutted his support base. He had evidently reached a personal point of no return, as demonstrated by his private admission to Blair that "we are not in the mode of walking out." 76 On July 22, the debate over whether Sinn Fein should be admitted to talks without prior decommissioning came to a head in a vote. The UUP, DUP, and UKUP all voted against it, with the result that when talks reconvened in September Sinn Fein was at the table but the Unionist parties were gone. 77 The DUP and UKUP had left for good, and tried to force the UUP to walk out through accusations that the party was betraying its people. Opinion polls showed that the UUP had popular support for remaining in the talks, but the party leadership was also under extreme pressure, even from within its own ranks. 78 This was the situation when the UUP finally entered negotiations under Trimble's leadership. Talks between the governments and the parties began seriously in October 1997.
Negotiations were organized in three strands. The first dealt with political arrangements within Northern Ireland, the second with North-South relations, and the third with relations between London and Dublin. Strand Two, concerning the relation between Ireland and Northern Ireland, was the most contested. In February, all parties agreed to an Easter deadline, and after a delay caused by ceasefire violations on both sides, the parties began serious negotiations in mid-March. 81 Paul Bew "Initiative to Trimble but his edge over opponents is thin," The Path to Peace, website, April, 1998 http://www.ireland.om/special/peace/results/analysis/analysis10.htm (5/25/2000) p. 1. 55% of Protestants approved the agreement. 82 In late 2000 The Northern Ireland Life and Times survey found that 14% of Protestants who voted "yes" in 1998 would now vote against the Agreement because of declining support for devolution and lack of progress on emerged as the largest party in the Assembly, anti-agreement parties were also able to interpret the election result as a victory, in particular because the transfer system of voting favored the UUP. 88 The election campaign also laid bare differences within the UUP over the agreement. Jeffrey Donaldson, a UUP Member of Parliament at Westminster, emerged as the most important opposition figure within the party but almost half of the leadership of the UUP openly opposed the accord. Some of these took seats in the Assembly, but they could not be counted on to vote the party line, further diluting the pro-agreement bloc. The UUP blocked Sinn Fein's entry to the Executive for 16 months, insisting again on prior IRA decommissioning, while Britain, Ireland, and mediators continued to try to broker a compromise. 91 In November 1999, a slim majority of 58 percent of UUP delegates approved entry into station." The relevant South African precedent here is not the failed CODESA idea of "sufficient consensus" which empowers and emboldens spoilers, and which, notably, fell apart twice without moving the process forward. Rather it is that powerful players committed to a settlement must make spoilers realize that they will be marginalized if they do not join the process. Recall that the NP and ANC negotiated the core elements of the South African settlement in secret in 1992, and then announced them as non-negotiable. Inkatha agreed to add its name to the ballot only days before the 1994 election, once when Buthelezi finally realized that it could not be derailed. 
From what could have been to what could be
There is nothing intrinsic to the conflicts in the Middle East and Northern Ireland that renders them less tractable than South Africa's. People miss this either because they focus on the wrong features of the conflicts, or because they focus on the wrong features of negotiations. Recognizing SAMENI conflicts as a particular type of transplacement, in which democratic legitimation is relied on to achieve agreement and make it stick, allows us to elaborate on the conditions that make settlements more and less likely, and to discuss the implications for the Middle East and Northern Ireland.
SAMENI negotiations revisited
Perhaps the most powerful challenges to our reasoning would come from the Middle East.
Some will contend that the conflict there is fundamentally different from that in A different lack-of-comparability objection focuses less on the stakes involved in the conflict and more on the proposed solution. One reason for this claim is that the two-state solution will never 113 In this connection it is perhaps heartening that at a conference on democratic transitions and consolidation consisting of some 100 academic experts from 36 countries plus 33 heads and former heads of state held in Madrid in October/November 2001, a final report was adopted in which it was agreed that "rights of citizenship should apply equally to all citizens" and that the majority "must avoid all temptation to define the nation in ethnic terms in the constitutional text or its political practice. At issue is less whether there is a two-state solution and more, whatever the solution, that it gains enough legitimacy that potential spoilers decide that challenging it is too costly. It is far from clear that this could not have occurred had the negotiations between Rabin and Arafat been able to conclude in 1995, or had Peres adopted a different policy than he did immediately following Rabin's death. We saw in §3.2 that at that time the two-state solution enjoyed considerable legitimacy. Blair was in an even stronger position to solve the enforcement problem in Northern Ireland after 1998, given his historic mandate in 1997 and the support for the agreement in both communities. In the end, it is only the legitimacy of the agreement itself that can get potential spoilers to adhere to the conditions of a peace settlement.
Because they often underestimate the importance of democratic legitimacy in any negotiated settlement, analysts often focus on, and pin their hopes upon, moderate leaders who are willing to push a peace agreement forward but lack the standing to face down radicals. For instance, Gerry Adams's emergence on the scene in 1988 as a new kind of pragmatic IRA leader "with a human face" led to endless speculation about whether a settlement could now be anticipated. But Adams and his behavior were irrelevant until the Blair government came to power in the UK in 1997-given the dependence of the Tory governments on Unionist support under Thatcher and Major.
Likewise, both US and Israeli negotiators have often focused on Palestinian players who could not be expected to deliver. The 2003 Middle East road map was a case in point. Arafat's corrupt government had lacked grassroots legitimacy since 1995, and the appointment of Mahmoud Abbas was scarcely a solution to this problem. With its political legitimacy, not to mention its security apparatus, in tatters, the PA was in no position to rein in the violence that followed the Aqaba summit. 114 The more Abbas was praised as "reasonable" in Jerusalem and Washington, the weaker he was bound to become in Ramallah. Caught between a rock and a hard place, any popularity he could Palestinian nationalist groups are doubtless aware that their strategy will never lead to outright victory over Israel, but their immediate target is not Israel. They are engaged in a struggle for control over the representation of the Palestinians, and failure of the peace process has solidified its support base. 115 Effective marginalization of Hamas was likely impossible by 2003, so that any lasting peace must involve dealing with them, perhaps in secret-at least initially. 116 Contrary to press reports at the time, Sharon's overture to the Palestinian Authority was not a case of Nixon going to China. 117 It was more like Nixon being dragged to Hong Kong.
Even when the right actors are on board, they may have to sell mutually incompatible solutions to their constituencies-at least until people realize that they can live with outcomes they had previously dismissed as unthinkable. Constructive ambiguity can help. There seems to be little question that in the Middle East obscurity about the final outcome, and even the interim steps, was essential for moving the process forward in 1995. Lack of clarity about such issues as the final status of Jerusalem, borders, settlements, and the right of return has been harshly criticized, but ambiguity about these issues was essential to creating a new reality in which Palestinians and Israelis accepted a two-state solution as legitimate. The South African success depended on the final agreement to abandon constitutionally mandated power sharing not being fully apparent earlier in negotiations.
As the South African process illustrates, the very fact of participating in negotiations can loosen up fixed perceptions. This is not to deny that constructive ambiguity can create implementation problems later. Northern Ireland and the Middle East have revealed all too clearly that it can. But without it they will not move forward, and the creative ingenuity of the players will never become focused on dealing with the implementation problems.
If the SAMENI cases suggest that negotiations proceed best if the final details are left for later, they also suggest that there is urgency in getting to an agreement. That the South African negotiations moved quickly and decisively contributed greatly to the result. Conversely, the slowing down of Middle East negotiations has repeatedly strengthened the hands of stonewallers and led windows of opportunity to close. The Bush administration seemed to appreciate this in the summer of 2003, when
Secretary of State Colin Powell argued forcefully for the need to "move urgently," not giving time for the "terrorists to win." 118 Even the most committed moderates must outrun the radicals and reactionaries who will be determined to prevent an agreement. The sooner a negotiated arrangement is seen as the new status quo, the less likely it is that recalcitrant forces will be able to destroy it.
Future prospects
Taken together, these observations suggest important lessons about the future prospects for negotiations in the Middle East and Northern Ireland. Despite continuing setbacks to the implementation of the Good Friday agreement, the Northern Ireland conflict appears considerably closer to resolution than the Middle East. Once decommissioning is seen in perspective, it becomes clear that the window of opportunity has been open for a good part of the time after 1998. Members of the Legislative Assembly speculate that support for the agreement has eroded in part precisely because it has been suspended so often that it seems unworkable. 119 The fact that it is suspended by Westminster makes it seem additionally undemocratic in the sense of being more vulnerable to external than electoral pressure. Blair was unwilling through 2004 to pay the political cost of putting real pressure on the Unionists, but he had both the mandate and the leeway so to do. Moreover, it seems reasonable to think that he might have done so, and that there may well be future opportunities for him or others to implement the Good Friday agreement-particularly for a Labour government with a large majority.
In 2004 there seemed to be three possibilities for Northern Ireland. Implementation could continue to move forward in fits and starts, but with everyday politics revolving less around the agreement and more around tangible improvements in areas like healthcare and employment. Polls show that popular support for the Agreement has been diminishing ever since it was signed, but also that most people in Northern Ireland believe that social welfare and the economy are more pressing issues than the relative political status of Unionists and Republicans. 120 It remains to be seen whether the voting public will be able to move the parties toward a similar consensus. Alternatively, if the stalemate on decommissioning persists, there might be another big international push (possibly again led by the US) to reach agreement on the outstanding issues. Publicity, attention, and deadlines would be used again, as they were in 1998, to generate a groundswell of support and excitement for implementation. Another possibility is a reversion to violence-even if the trend toward normal politics against the background of the Good Friday agreement makes this outcome less likely. But completely ruling it out assumes more backbone from the British government than Blair exhibited in facing down Unionist recalcitrance in his first five years in office, and it takes too static a view of the IRA leadership which could always revert to a military strategy.
Successfully maneuvering through the Middle East road map would require a great deal from Palestinian, Israeli and international actors. The toll of the intifada, as well as the changing regional situation after the US-Iraq war, led several key players to return to negotiations. At the same time, however, these same conditions limited the trust each side can hold in the other, and hence the likelihood that moderates can deliver an agreement. Prime Minister Sharon held his position largely due to the weakness of the traditional Israeli peace camp. Given this reality, not to mention his history and ideology, he was unlikely to become a reformer. 121 Indeed, his 2002 decision to construct a massive fence in the West Bank was less likely meant to ensure the end of terrorism-at which it failed-than to make conditions unbearable, thus stimulating Palestinian emigration from the occupied territories. 122 Yet, if he appeared less than eager to negotiate, he was capable of delivering.
Deteriorating conditions had led many settlers to announce that they would accept evacuation from the settlements in return for economic compensation, thus weakening the right flank. 123 If Sharon chose to enter into the negotiations full-steam ahead, he could sideline his right wing supporters and offer
Labor participation in his government. 124 As the historical champion of the peace process they would have little choice but to join. Sharon would have burned his bridges behind him, enhancing, from the standpoint of our analyses, the prospects for peace. place at the table. 126 Because even this would be unlikely to satisfy the hardliners who wanted only to see Israel pushed into the sea, the need for security remained. A successful solution would thus require a significant change in the attitudes of both Palestinian and Israeli hardliners in the long run. 127 The difficulty of the task should not surprise us. We have seen that the windows of opportunity that make settlements possible open rarely, and they seldom stay open for long. Few politicians are willing to take the considerable risks involved in moving through them. Indeed, they often fail to see either the possibilities or how fleeting they might be. A better and more widespread understanding of the dynamics of SAMENI negotiations, and of their consistency with the logic of transplacements, might diminish that possibility.
Concluding comments
Conflict studies have been driven in part by a debate, often implicit, over whether conflict is driven from above-by political elites manipulating followers to gross acts of violence-or from below-by ancient and primordial hatreds nurtured in families, communities, and places of worship.
The study of conflict resolution is similarly riveted, and focuses either on elite dispositions to negotiate or on grassroots initiatives to foster tolerance. One of the functions of the imperfect democratic settings we study in these cases is to draw the link, both empirically and analytically, between the two levels of focus.
In the middle of a peace process, a society lacks both the security of a hard line and retaliation (which represent the status quo ante), and the legitimacy of a democratic settlement (which is the final goal). Suspended thus between an unsustainable past and an unreachable future, elite politics becomes polarized. When the politics of the conflict-a fairly clear delineation between two sides-gives way to the politics of peace-in which each side breaks into two or more factions-the most important contests are those that take place among the factions. And in these fights, the primary weapon is popular support.
In both the Middle East and Northern Ireland the way forward seems primarily constrained not by elites or masses alone, but by the link between them. In both places those factions that reject a settlement, or that reject the particular settlement that is on the 
